# NGINX2Shell (CVE-2026-123007): nginx HTTP/2 Flaws, Detection, Fix

nginx 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 fix two HTTP/2 memory bugs and eight further issues. Which setups are exposed, how to check them and why a reload is not enough.

Source: https://zyberum.com/insights/nginx2shell-cve-2026-123007 · Updated: 2026-11-19

On 18 November 2026 nginx 1.31.9 (mainline) and 1.30.7 (stable) were released with ten security fixes. Two of them are in the HTTP/2 module: CVE-2026-123007, a memory corruption in flow control, and CVE-2026-123633, a use after free. Both are reachable without authentication where HTTP/2 is enabled, the second one only under additional conditions. The usual result is a crashed worker process. According to F5, code execution is possible where ASLR is disabled or can be bypassed.

The names NGINX2Shell and NGINX2Root are not vendor terms. Neither nginx.org nor the text of the CVE records uses them. "Nginx2Shell" is used by JFrog and others for the two HTTP/2 bugs, "NGINX2Root" is the name Xint gave its set of five nginx bugs plus one Linux kernel bug, and Red Hat adopted it as the title of its bulletin. As of 19 November 2026 no exploitation in the wild has been reported, but a proof of concept for CVE-2026-123007 is public. This guide is part of our series on the [2Shell vulnerabilities](/insights/2shell-vulnerabilities-overview).

## The facts in one table

All ten issues are fixed in nginx 1.31.9 and 1.30.7. The one exception in the table is the PROXY protocol bug, which exists only in the 1.31 mainline branch and is fixed in 1.31.9.

| CVE | Module | Bug class | Needs in the configuration | Affected | Severity, by whom |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123007 | HTTP/2 (`ngx_http_v2_module`), flow control | Integer underflow leading to a heap out-of-bounds write (CWE-191, CWE-787) | HTTP/2 enabled, nothing else | 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: major. F5: CVSS 4.0 9.2, CVSS 3.1 8.1. Red Hat: Critical. Ubuntu: High |
| CVE-2026-123633 | HTTP/2 (`ngx_http_v2_module`) | Use after free (CWE-416) | HTTP/2 enabled, proxying to a backend, `worker_connections` running short | 1.19.7 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: medium. F5: 9.2 and 8.1. Red Hat: Critical |
| CVE-2026-123634 | Resolver | Use after free (CWE-416) | `resolver`, a proxied server name with variables, an SSI or `mirror` subrequest that resolves the same name | 0.6.18 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: medium. F5: 9.2 and 8.1. Red Hat: Important |
| CVE-2026-121810 | HTTP/3 (`ngx_http_v3_module`) | Use after free (CWE-416) | HTTP/3 enabled (`listen ... quic`), `worker_connections` running short | 1.25.0 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: medium. F5: 9.2 and 8.1. Red Hat: Critical |
| CVE-2026-113425 | Mail proxy (`ngx_mail_proxy_module`) | Use after free (CWE-416) | A `mail {}` block that acts as a proxy | 0.5.33 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: major. F5: 9.2 and 8.1. Red Hat: Critical |
| CVE-2026-118899 | Request body over TLS | Infinite loop | Reading a client request body over TLS 1.3 | 1.13.0 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: major |
| CVE-2026-120993 | PROXY protocol | NULL pointer dereference | PROXY protocol v2 | 1.31.4 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: minor |
| CVE-2026-125283 | `alias` with `try_files` | Buffer overflow | `alias` used together with `try_files` | 0.9.6 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: minor |
| CVE-2026-120967 | Stream, TLS | SNI bypass with client certificate validation | `stream` with client certificate validation | 1.25.5 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: medium |
| CVE-2026-123640 | Stream, `ssl_preread` | Insufficient validation | `ssl_preread` in `stream` | 1.15.2 to 1.31.8 | nginx.org: minor |

The ratings do not agree. F5, which assigned the CVE ids, scores all of the first five at 9.2 on CVSS 4.0 and 8.1 on CVSS 3.1 with the vector `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`. nginx.org labels three of the same five as "medium". NVD had not published its own score on 19 November. For the last five rows we list the nginx.org label only.

The exploitation status is also described differently. The CISA entry on the CVE records says "Exploitation: none" although Rapid7 has published a proof of concept for CVE-2026-123007. None of the CVEs is in the CISA KEV catalogue. Wiz and Xint state that they have working exploits and do not release them.

## Which installations are exposed?

For the two HTTP/2 bugs: every nginx from the affected version range that accepts HTTP/2 connections from a client an attacker can control. nginx speaks HTTP/2 only where the configuration enables it, but most builds contain the module and many configurations switch it on.

The other three memory bugs have their own switches:

| CVE | Directives that enable the affected code |
|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123007 | `listen ... http2` (syntax of 1.9.5 to 1.25.0, still accepted later) or `http2 on;` |
| CVE-2026-123633 | HTTP/2 as above and a backend: `proxy_pass`, `fastcgi_pass`, `uwsgi_pass`, `scgi_pass`, `grpc_pass` and similar, while free worker connections run low |
| CVE-2026-123634 | `resolver`, a proxied server name built from variables, and an SSI or `mirror` subrequest |
| CVE-2026-121810 | `listen ... quic`, that is HTTP/3. Disabling HTTP/2 does not help here |
| CVE-2026-113425 | A `mail {}` block that proxies, according to Xint with `proxy on` and `auth_http` |

### What a CDN or load balancer in front changes

It reduces the exposure of the HTTP/2 bugs and does not remove it. What counts is which system terminates the HTTP/2 connection of the client.

A secondary source reports statements by CDN vendors that origins reachable only through their proxy are protected while you update. We could not confirm these statements at the vendors and treat them as unconfirmed.

### Packages and derivatives on 19 November 2026

The status below is a snapshot and will change. "Not yet fixed" means that no fixed package was listed when the page was read.

| Product | Status | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| nginx open source | Fixed | 1.31.9 and 1.30.7. Legacy branches such as 1.28 and 1.26 received no upstream release |
| NGINX Plus | Fixed | 37.3.0.1 (CR) and 37.0.8.1 (LTS) cover both HTTP/2 bugs. CVE-2026-123633 alone was already fixed in 37.2.0.1 and 37.0.7.1 of 14 October 2026. For older release trains the CVE records name no fixed build |
| Official Docker image `nginx` | Fixed | Tags `1.31.9`, `mainline`, `latest`, `1.30.7`, `stable` and their variants. Older pinned tags such as `stable-bookworm` were not rebuilt |
| Ubuntu | Fixed, USN-9159-1 | 26.10: `1.30.4-7ubuntu1.2`, 26.04: `1.28.3-2ubuntu1.13`, 24.04: `1.24.0-2ubuntu7.20`, 22.04: `1.18.0-6ubuntu14.23`. 20.04, 18.04 and 16.04 only with Ubuntu Pro |
| Debian | Partly fixed | trixie: `1.26.3-3+deb13u11` (DSA-6642-1), sid: `1.30.6-4`. bookworm (`1.22.1-9+deb12u10`) and forky (`1.30.6-3`) not yet fixed |
| Alpine | Fixed | edge and 3.24: `1.30.7-r0`, 3.23 and 3.22: `1.28.3-r8` |
| RHEL 8, 9, 10 | Not yet fixed | Affected, no errata listed. Red Hat states that it is expediting the fixes. The 3scale image `apicast-gateway-rhel8` is affected as well |
| nginx.org RPM repository | Fixed, with a catch | The 1.30.7 packages carry no security metadata, so `dnf upgrade --security` does not select them. Run a plain upgrade |
| OpenResty | Not yet fixed | The latest release 1.31.8.1 bundles nginx 1.31.8. An issue is open, without an answer from the maintainers |
| Angie, freenginx, Tengine | Not stated | None of the projects had published a statement or a release that names these CVEs. The latest freenginx release is 1.31.5, the latest Tengine release builds on the nginx 1.31.5 core. Treat them as affected until the project says otherwise |
| Kubernetes ingress-nginx (community) | Will not be fixed | The repository is archived since 24 March 2026 and receives no security updates. The last release v1.15.1 bundles nginx 1.27.1, with HTTP/2 enabled by default on port 443 |
| F5 NGINX Ingress Controller, NGINX Gateway Fabric | Unclear | New releases appeared on 18 November (v5.8.0, v2.9.0). The release notes do not name the bundled nginx version. Check the version in the running image |
| AlmaLinux, Amazon Linux, SUSE | Reported, unconfirmed | A secondary source reports fixed packages for AlmaLinux and Amazon Linux and an ongoing analysis at SUSE. Check the advisory of the distribution |

Products that bundle their own nginx, such as API gateways, NAS systems and appliances, are not patched by an update of the host operating system. JFrog states that the nginx bundled with Artifactory normally has HTTP/2 off and that a patched release is in progress. For other vendors, ask for a statement. One user report describes the AKS app routing add-on as shipping nginx 1.27.1 with HTTP/2 on and without a supported switch to disable it. The maintainers had not answered when we checked.

## How do the HTTP/2 bugs work?

Both are memory-safety bugs in `ngx_http_v2_module`: one is a counter that goes below zero and then permits a write past a buffer, the other is a connection that is released while a request still uses it.

### CVE-2026-123007: flow control

HTTP/2 uses flow control: each side keeps a window, a number that says how much data may still be transferred. The CVE record describes an integer underflow in the accounting of this window. After the underflow the window "can exceed its allowed threshold", and nginx writes beyond a buffer on the heap. The nginx changelog calls it "a flow control window overflow in HTTP/2".

The figure shows the principle. It is schematic: the advisories publish neither buffer sizes nor the memory layout.

The bug affects the data plane only and needs no special configuration beyond HTTP/2. It was confirmed over HTTPS on 64-bit systems.

### CVE-2026-123633: use after free under connection pressure

The second bug needs more conditions. nginx accepts HTTP/2 from clients and proxies the requests to a backend. When the worker runs short of free `worker_connections`, nginx may reuse or close a connection that still serves a request. The memory of that connection is then used after it was freed. The changelog describes it as a use after free "when using HTTP/2 if worker_connections were not enough".

CVE-2026-121810 is the same family on HTTP/3: a use after free when `worker_connections` are not enough, according to Xint reached when HTTP/3 requests are forwarded to an upstream.

### How hard is exploitation?

The sources disagree, and the honest answer is: a crash is the expected outcome, code execution has been shown by researchers under their conditions.

- **F5** ties code execution to ASLR being disabled or bypassed. **Wiz** writes that ASLR does not protect against the two HTTP/2 issues and that its lab exploits include a bypass. **Xint** reports working exploits against endpoints in public clouds.
- **Rapid7** describes the limits of its published proof of concept for CVE-2026-123007: about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data within the default connection lifetime of one hour, and a dependency on one specific `memcpy` variant of glibc on x86-64. That describes this proof of concept and is not a safe threshold.
- **Exposure numbers** in the press are counts of version banners, not of confirmed vulnerable servers, and the published totals differ between sources.

## How to identify it

Check four things per instance: the version of the package, whether the configuration enables the affected modules, whether HTTP/2 is negotiated from outside, and whether the process that runs is the patched binary.

### 1. Version and build

```bash
nginx -v 2>&1
nginx -V 2>&1 | grep -- '--with-http_v2_module'

# Packages: compare with the tracker of your distribution
dpkg -l 'nginx*' | awk '/^ii/{print $2, $3}'
rpm -q nginx
apk info -v nginx
```

Upstream versions 1.9.5 to 1.30.6 and 1.31.0 to 1.31.8 are affected by CVE-2026-123007. Distribution packages keep the old upstream number after a backport, so `nginx -v` and the `Server` banner say nothing about a patched Debian or Ubuntu package. Compare the full package version with the table above or with the tracker of the distribution.

### 2. Configuration

```bash
# HTTP/2 enabled?
nginx -T 2>&1 | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE 'listen[[:space:]].*http2|^[[:space:]]*http2[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]*;'

# Backend present (CVE-2026-123633)?
nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -nE '\b(proxy|fastcgi|uwsgi|scgi|grpc|memcached|tunnel)_pass\b'

# HTTP/3, resolver, mirror, SSI, mail proxy (the other fixes)
nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -nE 'quic|http3|resolver|mirror|ssi[[:space:]]+on|^[[:space:]]*mail[[:space:]]*\{'
```

`nginx -T` prints the configuration on disk. Until the next reload it can differ from what the running process uses.

### 3. Check from outside whether HTTP/2 is negotiated

```bash
openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | grep ALPN
curl -sI --http2 https://HOST -o /dev/null -w '%{http_version}\n'

# On the host: HTTP/3 and mail listeners
ss -lunp 'sport = :443'
ss -ltnp | grep -E ':(25|110|143|465|587|993|995)'
```

`ALPN protocol: h2` or the output `2` means that HTTP/2 is negotiated. Run the check against the origin address and not only against the public name: a test through the CDN tests the CDN.

### 4. Containers and Kubernetes ingress controllers

```bash
docker ps --format '{{.Image}}'
kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"\t"}{.spec.containers[*].image}{"\n"}{end}' | grep -iE 'nginx|openresty|kong|apisix'
kubectl exec -n NS POD -- nginx -v
```

Read the version inside the container, not from the tag. Images that bundle nginx need a rebuild on a fixed base image and a new deployment: restarting a running container keeps the old image.

Every release of the community ingress-nginx controller bundles an affected nginx, with HTTP/2 enabled by default on port 443. Since the project is retired, this finding does not go away with an update.

### 5. Verify that the new binary is running

A reload is not enough. `nginx -s reload` re-reads the configuration and starts new workers from the same master process. It does not start a new executable. The nginx documentation describes two ways to change the binary: the upgrade sequence with the signals USR2, WINCH and QUIT, or a full restart.

```bash
systemctl restart nginx

# "(deleted)" behind the path means: this process still runs the replaced file
for p in $(pgrep -x nginx); do echo "$p $(readlink /proc/$p/exe)"; done

# Start time of master and workers, and workers that are still shutting down
ps -eo pid,ppid,lstart,cmd | grep '[n]ginx'
```

Workers shown as "shutting down" run the old code until their last connection ends. The Ubuntu notice says only that a standard system update makes all necessary changes and does not mention a restart. Verify it yourself.

### 6. Log and crash signs

All sources call the following general warning signs, not confirmed indicators. JFrog writes that there are no confirmed indicators of compromise yet.

```bash
grep -Ei 'worker process.*exited|signal 11|segfault' /var/log/nginx/error.log
coredumpctl list nginx
docker logs C 2>&1 | grep "exited on signal"
ss -tinp state established '( sport = :443 )'
```

| Where | Sign |
|---|---|
| `error.log` | `worker process N exited on signal 11`, in series |
| `error.log` | `N worker_connections are not enough, reusing connections`, followed by crashes (CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810) |
| `error.log` | `could not cancel <name> resolving` alerts, especially for unfamiliar names (resolver bug) |
| Connections | Long-lived HTTP/2 connections from one address with very large inbound and small outbound byte counts, often together with many short TLS connections from the same address |
| Access log | Little. The relevant frames, such as WINDOW_UPDATE and RST_STREAM, are not requests. A `log_format` with `$connection`, `$connection_requests` and `$request_length` helps to compare received bytes with logged requests |
| Process audit | Any program started by the user of the nginx workers. Record `execve` and `execveat` with auditd and investigate at once |

Look back at least one week. One source reports that the HTTP/2 fixes were visible in the public repository from 11 November, a date we could not confirm.

Do not expect a network signature to help. None of the sources names an IDS rule, a WAF rule or a scanner plugin. The traffic is inside TLS and at the framing layer of HTTP/2.

## What to do

Update, restart, verify. The update is the only complete fix, and F5 lists no workaround for the two HTTP/2 bugs.

1. **Update nginx** to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7, NGINX Plus to 37.3.0.1 (CR) or 37.0.8.1 (LTS), or install the fixed package of your distribution. Legacy upstream branches get no fix: rely on a distribution backport or move to a supported branch.
2. **Restart or upgrade the binary**, then verify the running process as in step 5 above. A reload leaves the old executable in memory.
3. **Order by exposure**: internet-facing HTTP/2 endpoints first, then reverse proxies, then the rest.
4. **Rebuild and redeploy container images** on a fixed base. Pinned older tags of the official image were not rebuilt.
5. **Plan the migration off ingress-nginx.** The community controller will not receive a fix. Disabling HTTP/2 there is a stopgap, not a state to stay in.
6. **Where no fixed package exists yet** (Debian bookworm and forky, RHEL on 19 November): apply the interim measures below or use the nginx.org packages. On RPM systems with the nginx.org repository run a plain upgrade, because the `--security` filter misses the package.
7. **Ask vendors of bundled copies** for their status: OpenResty-based products, API gateways, NAS systems, appliances.
8. **Review logs** for the signs above. Where a worker of nginx has started another program, treat the host as compromised.

### If you cannot update today

These measures remove the precondition of single bugs. They are temporary, and each covers only the CVEs named in its row.

| Measure | Effect | Limit |
|---|---|---|
| nginx 1.25.1 and later: `http2 off;` in every affected `server` block and remove `http2` from the `listen` lines. Older versions: change `listen 443 ssl http2;` to `listen 443 ssl;` | Closes the path to CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 | Clients fall back to HTTP/1.1. Native gRPC and everything that needs HTTP/2 end to end breaks. Not a workaround from F5, recommended by researchers and Red Hat |
| No SSI or `mirror`, no proxied server name with variables. Point `proxy_pass` at a fixed `upstream` group | Workaround from F5 for CVE-2026-123634, the fixed `upstream` group is the advice of Xint | Switching off `mirror` alone may not be enough, other subrequest features may reach the code |
| Remove `quic` from `listen`, set `http3 off;`, send `add_header Alt-Svc 'clear' always;` | Closes the path to CVE-2026-121810 | HTTP/3 clients fall back to TCP |
| Restrict mail listeners to trusted networks or bind them to loopback, or remove the `mail` context | For CVE-2026-113425. F5 names the restriction to trusted networks, Xint the loopback binding, Red Hat the removal | Red Hat calls the restriction to trusted clients a partial mitigation |
| ingress-nginx: `use-http2: "false"` in the ConfigMap | Reported as a stopgap for the HTTP/2 bugs, not confirmed by a primary source | Not possible on managed add-ons that forbid ConfigMap edits. The controller stays unpatched |
| Firewall the origin so that only the CDN or load balancer reaches it | The CDN terminates the HTTP/2 connection of the client | Depends on the implementation of the CDN, does not cover internal clients |

Apply and check the HTTP/2 change like this:

```bash
nginx -t && nginx -s reload
openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>/dev/null | grep ALPN
```

After the reload the existing connections stay on the old workers until they close. The measure is effective once those workers have exited and ALPN no longer offers `h2`.

### Hardening that limits the damage

None of this prevents the memory corruption. It decides how far an attacker gets afterwards and how fast you notice.

- **Keep ASLR enabled**, and do not rely on it. F5 conditions code execution on ASLR being disabled or bypassed, Wiz states that it does not protect against the HTTP/2 issues.
- **Block the SCTP kernel module where it is not needed.** The chain that Xint describes from nginx worker to root uses a separate bug in the Linux kernel SCTP code, which the nginx update does not fix. On hosts without a need for SCTP, a line `install sctp /bin/false` under `/etc/modprobe.d/` prevents loading the module. It does not unload a loaded module (`lsmod | grep sctp`) and has no effect where SCTP is built into the kernel. We found neither a CVE id nor a patch status for this kernel bug.
- **Restrict origins** to the CDN or load balancer in front of them.
- **Alert on worker crashes** and on processes started by the nginx user.
- **Do not run "proof of concept" repositories from unknown authors** on production systems. Sources warn of fake repositories.

## Two earlier nginx advisories in 2026

The release continues a series: nginx.org lists 36 advisories with CVE ids from 2026. Two earlier ones follow the same pattern of a heap overflow behind a specific configuration, with the same F5 scores of 9.2 (CVSS 4.0) and 8.1 (CVSS 3.1).

| | CVE-2026-42945 | CVE-2026-42533 |
|---|---|---|
| Module | `ngx_http_rewrite_module` | `map` with regular expressions |
| Bug | Heap buffer overflow | Heap buffer overflow in a worker |
| Configuration | A `rewrite` with an unnamed capture (`$1`, `$2`) and a `?` in the replacement, followed by another `rewrite`, `if` or `set` | A `map` with regex matching, where a string expression references the capture variables before the output variable of the map |
| Published | 13 May 2026 | 15 July 2026 |
| nginx.org label | medium | major |
| Affected | 0.6.27 to 1.30.0 | 0.9.6 to 1.31.2 |
| Fixed | 1.31.0, 1.30.1. NGINX Plus R36 P4, R32 P6 | 1.31.3, 1.30.4. NGINX Plus 37.0.3.1, R36 P7 |
| Exploitation | VulnCheck reported exploitation attempts against its canaries within days, according to SecurityWeek. Not in CISA KEV | The CISA entry records a proof of concept. Not in CISA KEV |

CVE-2026-42945 is also known as "NGINX Rift", a name from the finder depthfirst and again not from nginx.org. The finder's interim measure was to replace unnamed captures with named captures. Both are fixed in every version that contains the November fixes, so one update to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7 closes all three rounds.

## What it means for a penetration test

A reverse proxy is part of the attack surface of every application behind it. In a [web application penetration test](/web-application-pentest) we record the front end as well: which nginx build answers, which protocols it negotiates, whether the origin can be reached past the CDN, which ingress controller runs in the cluster. For these vulnerabilities we verify exposure through versions and configuration. We do not send triggering traffic to production systems, because the first visible effect of a hit is a crashed worker and dropped connections.

## FAQ

**Is a reload enough after the package update?**

No. A reload re-reads the configuration and starts new workers from the same master process, so the old executable keeps running. Restart nginx or use the binary upgrade sequence described in the nginx documentation, then check that master and workers run the new file.

**We do not use HTTP/2. Do we still have to update?**

Yes. Without HTTP/2 the two HTTP/2 bugs are not reachable, but the same release fixes eight further issues, among them use-after-free bugs in the resolver, in HTTP/3 and in the mail proxy. Which of them apply depends on your configuration, and the update covers all of them.

**Does a CDN or load balancer in front of nginx protect us?**

Only partly. If the CDN terminates HTTP/2, nginx usually receives the connection of the CDN and not the frames of the attacker. That holds only if the origin cannot be reached directly, and it does not cover internal clients. None of the researchers presents it as a fix.

**nginx -v shows an old version on Debian or Ubuntu. Are we vulnerable?**

Not necessarily. Distributions backport the fix and keep the old upstream number, for example 1.24.0-2ubuntu7.20 on Ubuntu 24.04. Compare the full package version with the security tracker of your distribution, not with the upstream number.

## Sources

- [nginx.org: security advisories](https://nginx.org/en/security_advisories.html)
- [nginx.org: CHANGES (1.31.9)](https://nginx.org/en/CHANGES)
- [nginx.org: controlling nginx (signals, upgrading the executable)](https://nginx.org/en/docs/control.html)
- [CVE record CVE-2026-123007 (F5 as CNA)](https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-123007)
- [NGINX Plus releases](https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/releases/)
- [Red Hat Security Bulletin RHSB-2026-019](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-019)
- [Ubuntu Security Notice USN-9159-1](https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9159-1)
- [Debian security tracker: CVE-2026-123007](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123007)
- [kubernetes/ingress-nginx (archived repository)](https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx)
- [Xint: NGINX2Root](https://xint.io/blog/nginx2root-remote-code-execution)
- [Wiz: nginx HTTP/2 RCE vulnerabilities](https://www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-http2-rce-vulnerabilities)
- [Rapid7: CVE-2026-123007, nginx HTTP/2 integer underflow](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-123007-critical-nginx-http-2-integer-underflow-leads-to-rce-fixed/)

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---
Zyberum GmbH. Canonical page: https://zyberum.com/insights/nginx2shell-cve-2026-123007
